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Orientation: Employees are a source of competitive advantage for organisations and human 
resource management seek to promote employee efficiency. One of the tools organisations 
utilise to achieve this goal is performance appraisals.
Research purpose: The purpose of this study was to investigate the weaknesses in performance 
appraisal and to determine whether it is politicised in the North West Department of Health 
and Social Development in South Africa. 
Motivation for study: Many organisations either ignore the existence of politics in the appraisal 
process or assume that its impact can be minimised if they refine their appraisal instruments. 
Executives admit that, in appraising others, they often intentionally avoid meeting the goal 
of accuracy in favour of achieving goals that have more to do with exercising discretion and 
maintaining  departmental  effectiveness.  Ironically,  these  same  executives  lament  that  the 
appraisals they receive often do not accurately represent their abilities and performance (Gioia 
& Longenecker, 1994).
Research approach, design and method: Self-administered questionnaires were used as a 
means of collecting data and analysis was done through the use of the Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences (SPSS).
Main findings: The results of the study showed that respondents believe that performance 
appraisals are highly politicised. 
Practical/managerial implications: If used effectively, performance appraisals may improve 
employee productivity and efficiency as well as motivation and performance. However, if 
performance appraisal is perceived as unfair and political, it can diminish rather than enhance 
employee attitudes and performance.
Contribution: Amongst others, it is recommended that managers should consider separating 
assessment for development and assessment for rewards.
Introduction
Key focus of the study
Many organisations are aware of the role employees can play as a source of competitive advantage. 
As a consequence, organisations implement human resource management (HRM) policies and 
practices that seek to promote employee productivity and efficiency (Brown & Benson, 2005; 
Linna et al., 2012). One of these practices is performance appraisal (PA). If used effectively, PAs 
may improve employee productivity and efficiency as well as motivation and performance. 
Background 
The notion that people at work should be assessed is eminently sensible. This procedure is 
potentially of enormous benefit to both the individual and the organisation in that the feedback 
provides people a basis to set goals to both evaluate and improve their performance. Why then are 
both the provider and recipient of this service frequently dissatisfied with the outcome (Latham, 
2008; Shrivastava & Purang, 2011; Spence & Keeping, 2011)? 
Organisational politics is simply a fact of life. (Gioia & Longenecker, 1994). For years, personal 
experiences, hunches and anecdotal evidence have supported a general belief that behaviour 
in and of organisations is often political in nature. But it is fair to say that there has been a 
considerable  lack  of  convergence  amongst  organisational  scientists  concerning  exactly  what 
constitutes political behaviour. Some have defined organisational politics in terms of the behaviour 
of interest groups to use power to influence decision-making. Others have focused on the self-
serving and organisationally non-sanctioned nature of individual behaviour in organisations. 
Others have characterised organisational politics as a social influence process with potentially 
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functional  or  dysfunctional  organisational  consequences 
or simply the management of influence. Perhaps it is these 
fragmentations  and  the  differing  perspectives  that  have 
prompted  some  scholars  to  state  that  ‘the  meaning  of 
organisational  politics  remains  largely  unknown,  in  spite 
of  the  importance  of  political  behaviour  to  organisational 
functioning’ (Vredenburgh & Maurer, 1984, p. 47; see also 
Gandz & Murray, 1980; Mayes & Allen, 1977; Shrivastava & 
Purang, 2011).
However, if PAs are perceived as unfair, they can diminish 
rather than enhance employee attitudes and performance. 
Specifically,  perceptions  of  procedural  unfairness  in 
effecting PA can adversely affect employees’ organisational 
commitment,  job  satisfaction,  trust  in  management 
and  performance,  as  well  as  their  work-related  stress, 
organisational  citizenship  behaviour,  theft  and  inclination 
to litigate against their employer (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, 
Porter & Ng, 2001; Fanga & Gerhart, 2012; Greenberg, 1991; 
Judge & Colquitt, 2004; Kay, Meyer & French, 1965; Werner 
& Bolino, 1997, cited by Heslin & Vande Walle, 2009). 
If  employees  believe  that  the  appraisal  was  undertaken 
lightly  or  haphazardly,  they  may  take  the  process  less 
seriously  than  they  should.  Possible  legal  ramifications 
exist  whenever  management  is  not  consistent  in  its  PA 
procedures. A loss of morale or employee productivity may 
also result from poorly administered PAs (Grobler, Warnich, 
Carrell, Elbert & Hatfield, 2006; Migiro & Tadera, 2011). It is 
a well-known axiom that politics often plays a dominant role 
in important organisational decisions and actions. Although 
politics  is  associated  with  many  events  in  organisational 
life, the political nature of these events is either too elusive 
or  too  cleverly  concealed  to  be  discerned  easily  (Gioia  & 
Longenecker, 1994).
Many organisations either ignore the existence of politics in the 
appraisal process or assume that its impact can be minimised 
if they refine their appraisal instruments. Executives admit 
that,  in  appraising  others,  they  often  intentionally  avoid 
meeting the goal of accuracy in favour of achieving goals that 
have more to do with exercising discretion and maintaining 
departmental effectiveness, that is, they view the appraisal 
process as a way of achieving desired results, and this priority 
supersedes their concern for accuracy or playing by the rules. 
Ironically, these same executives lament that the appraisals 
they receive often do not accurately represent their abilities 
and performance (Gioia & Longenecker, 1994).
In  the  North  West  Department  of  Health  and  Social 
Development  (NWDoH  &  Soc  Dev),  all  managers  are 
expected  to  have  a  formal  performance  review  with  their 
employees at least twice a year, and a formal performance 
feedback session once every quarter (North West Department 
of Health, 2003). The manager’s fundamental responsibility 
is to get results through people; a systematic approach to 
assessing the human asset at one’s disposal is a must. 
Research purpose
The  idea  that  executives  might  deliberately  distort  and 
manipulate  appraisals  for  political  purposes  seems 
unspeakable.  Yet  there  is  extensive  evidence  to  indicate 
that, behind a mask of objectivity and rationality, executives 
engage in such manipulation in an intentional and systematic 
manner (Byrne, Pitts, Wilson & Steiner, 2012; Erdogan, 2002; 
Ferris,  Fedor,  Chachere  &  Pondy,  1989;  Kim  &  Rubianty, 
2011; Longenecker, Sims & Gioia, 1992; Salimäki & Jämsén, 
2010; Shrivastava & Purang, 2011; Spence & Keeping, 2011).
The purpose of this study was to investigate the weaknesses 
in  performance  appraisal  and  to  determine  whether  it  is 
politicised  in  the  North  West  Department  of  Health  and 
Social Development in South Africa.
Literature review
Performance appraisal
Performance appraisal (PA) is a formal, structured system 
for  measuring,  evaluating  and  influencing  an  employee’s 
job-related  attributes,  behaviours  and  outcomes.  Its  focus 
is  on  discovering  how  productive  the  employee  is  and 
whether they can perform as effectively or more effectively 
in the future (Haines & St-Onge, 2012; Hellriegel, Jackson & 
Slocum, 2002; Hellriegel, Spence & Keeping, 2011). 
Longenecker, Sims and Gioia (1987) report that:
Almost every executive has dreaded performance appraisal at 
some time or the other. They hate to give them and they hate to 
receive them. Yet like them or not, every executive recognises 
that appraisals are a fact of organisational life.
Certain  organisational  processes  lend  themselves  to  being 
viewed  as  more  political  than  others.  They  are  processes 
in  which  managerial  discretion  is  high  and  which  relate 
to success or failure at work, relationships with superiors 
and inter-unit lateral relations. Insofar as an individual, or 
others  positively  regarded,  may  not  succeed  to  the  level 
expected, it is convenient to believe the decisions were not 
rational and hence were political (Haines & St-Onge, 2012; 
Kim & Rubianty, 2011; Shrivastava & Purang, 2011). To the 
extent that processes such as work appraisals, promotions 
or  transfers  rest  in  fact  on  ill-defined,  poorly  known  or 
ambiguous  criteria,  such  perceptions  will  be  exacerbated 
(Gandz & Murray, 1980).
The purpose and objective of performance appraisals: The 
overall purpose of appraisal is to provide information about 
work performance. (Macan et al., 2011; Swanepoel, Erasmus, 
Van Wyk & Schenk, 2003). Jawahaar (2006) sees the purpose 
of formal PAs as the provision of clear, performance-based 
feedback to employees. 
Performance should be limited to the evaluation of employee 
goal  attainment,  employee  compliance  with  the  shared 
values of the organisation and the extent to which managers, 
supervisors and employees live these values. In the case of 
supervisors and managers, it is also important to measure 
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the extent to which they unlock and utilise the potential of 
their team members. This implies that the performance of 
managers and supervisors should also be measured in terms 
of their core task – the extent to which they have succeeded in 
making their team members successful (Coetsee, 2002).
W. Edwards Demming, known as the leading personality 
of  the  quality  revolution,  labelled  performance  appraisal 
systems a ‘deadly disease’ in organisations, and claimed that 
they ‘leave people bitter, crushed, bruised, battered, desolate, 
despondent, dejected, feeling inferior, some even depressed, 
unfit for work for weeks after receipt of rating, unable to 
comprehend why they are inferior and both appraisers and 
appraisees alike find the PA process unpleasant’ (cited in 
Scullen, 2011, p. 8).
Key  challenges  of  performance  appraisals:  There  are 
probably as many problems associated with PA as there are 
reasons for its existence. At the centre of the organisational 
performance  challenge  lies  the  need  to  objectively  define 
measurable  performance  criteria  and  then  to  effectively 
attract,  select,  develop  and  reward  or  retain  competence 
(Charlton, 2000). A major problem of PA is the dichotomy 
between quantity and the quality of work. Too often a blanket 
approach is utilised to evaluate employees on the quantity 
of work performed and not necessarily on its quality. It is 
relatively easy to record the quantity of work performed but 
not so easy to estimate the quality of the same or other work 
(Hoskins, Leach & Neerputh, 2006).
Other weaknesses according to Analoui (2007) are that too 
often jobs have vague and unclear performance standards; 
as such the employees have to guess what is expected of 
them. Worse still, the performance standards are often set in 
isolation from employees, and this creates alienation and a 
lack of identification on their part. It is vital therefore to create 
a  two-way  channel  of  information  between  the  managers 
and  the  employees  regarding  performance  standards  and 
expectations.
Research on performance measurement in the public sector, 
which is generally a provider of services, indicates several 
difficulties  such  as  the  defining  of  outputs,  vagueness  of 
performance dimensions and that lines of accountability are 
complex (Smith, 1990; Van der Waldt, 2004).
Government  and  politicisation:  In  the  discussion  of 
performance  management  development  system  in  the 
North West Department of Health and Social Development 
(NWDoH & Soc Dev), the focus is on issues impacting on 
the appraisal of the performance of programme managers, 
middle managers as well as junior staff members on levels 
3–12, and the effect that the method or system has on the 
outcome with  a view to developing  acceptable guidelines 
or management for such appraisal. Poole and Warner (1998, 
cited by Neerputh, Leach & Hoskins, 2006, p. 53) state that 
‘the issue is not whether performance should be measured, 
but how?’ 
Transformation  and  reform:  The  government  regards 
transformation as a dynamic, focused and relatively short-
term process, designed to fundamentally reshape the public 
service  for  its  appointed  role  in  the  new  dispensation  in 
South Africa. (Republic of South Africa, 1995).
Rationale for performance management: The government’s 
vision,  mission  and  priorities  can  only  find  meaning 
provided its executive arm carries its mandate to the public 
in an efficient and effective manner. The development of a 
new organisational culture is critical to the improvement of 
efficient and effective public service delivery. These changes 
needed to be accompanied by a major shift from a rule-bound 
culture to one that is focused more on the achievement of 
objectives and the meeting of needs (North West Provincial 
Government, 1997).
The meaning of politicisation: There is lack of uniformity 
in the ways in which different writers define politicisation, 
commonly known as organisational or workplace politics. In 
one category are those who define it in a ‘neutral’ fashion as 
the occurrence of certain forms of behaviour associated with 
the use of power or influence. A second group tends to define 
it  in  terms  of  an  actor’s  subjectively  realised  intention  of 
engaging in self-serving behaviours at the expense of others 
in the organisation (Gandz & Murray, 1980).
According to Gioia & Longenecker (1994), many organisations 
either ignore the existence of politics in the appraisal process 
or assume that its impact can be minimised if they refine their 
appraisal instruments. For good or bad reasons, supervisors 
and managers make advance decisions of what they want 
to see happen and then use ratings as a vehicle to get those 
results. The goal may be to get someone a hefty pay raise or 
to ensure that someone is barred from promotion and this 
results in politicisation (Coens & Jenkins, 2000).
It is important for organisations to note that:
politics in employee appraisal will never be entirely squelched. 
More candidly, there is some place for politics in the appraisal 
process  to  facilitate  necessary  executive  discretion.  The  goal 
then, is not to arbitrarily and ruthlessly try to eliminate politics 
but,  instead,  to  effectively  manage  the  role  politics  plays  in 
employee appraisal (Longenecker et al., 1987, p. 191).
The focus of this research is on the second definition and the 
fact that organisations politicise performance appraisals and 
that this devalues the essence of appraising (Tziner, Latham, 
Price & Haccoun, 1996). Weller (1989, cited by Mulgan, 1998) 
begins with the assumption that politicisation is to be seen 
as  the  opposite  of  political  neutrality.  He  then  identifies 
it with two tendencies which can be said to contradict two 
aspects of neutrality: the use of the public service for party 
purposes  and  the  appointment,  promotion  and  tenure  of 
public servants through party political influences. 
The nature of politics in executive appraisal: At the heart of 
many appraisal function is an assessment and an evaluation 
of performance. The goal is fair and ‘objective’ measurement Original Research
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– measurement of the quality of one’s work and how it stands 
up against some standard or in comparison to others. It is 
known that the raters do not have all the facts, that appraisal 
is not particularly reliable, but they nonetheless pretend that 
it is a valid measurement as Gioia and Longenecker (1994, 
p. 50) further mention that:
•	 Politics is prevalent in appraisal, and the higher one rises 
in  the  [organisation],  the  more  political  the  appraisal 
process becomes. 
•	 Appraisals  are  susceptible  to  political  manipulation 
because of the dynamic, ambiguous nature of managerial 
work. Any rating a manager receives can be justified in 
some way, even if it is inaccurate. 
•	 Performance  is  not  necessarily  the  bottom  line  in  the 
executive appraisal process. It is easy to be kept in the 
dark  if  you  don’t  know  what  counts,  so  you  become 
apprehensive and suspicious that you are being used for 
someone else’s ends.’ 
•	 Senior  executives  have  extraordinary  latitude  in 
evaluating subordinate executives’ performance.
•	 Executive  appraisal  is  a  political  tool  used  to  control 
people and resources.
Consequences  of  corrupt  executive  appraisal: 
The  manipulative  practices  in  executive  appraisals 
unquestionably undermine the designed purpose of executive 
review, sacrificing fairness and benefiting some people at the 
expense of others. In addition to producing consequences 
and costs for individuals, these practices almost always hurt 
the organisation as a whole because of the following reasons:
•	 Political appraisals undermine [organisational] goals and 
performance.
•	 Political  appraisals  compromise  the  link  between 
executive  performance  and  outcomes.  Most  junior 
executives  avoid  clashing  with  their  boss,  because  the 
confrontation  amounts  to  an  unequal  power  contest 
they cannot possibly win. As a consequence, ambiguities 
persist and the junior executive’s performance suffers.
•	 Appraisal politics inhibits executive development. When 
appraisals  are  inflated  for  political  reasons,  they  give 
the junior executive a false sense of security, and often 
undesired  behaviours;  when  ratings  are  intentionally 
deflated,  frustration,  self-doubt,  bitterness,  and 
withdrawal can result.
•	 Politics at the executive level begets politics in the rest 
of  the  organisation.  If  the  top  of  the  organisation  is 
characterised by politically driven promotions, bonuses 
and rewards, similar practices are sure to occur at lower 
levels. The net effect is blanket cynicism and suspicion 
about the appraisal process itself. The political appraisal 
thus becomes a triggering event, with politics eventually 
showing up in other organisational domains (Gioia and 
Longenecker, 1994, p. 55).
•	 Political  appraisals  can  expose  an  organisation  to 
litigation  when  executives  are  terminated.  Without 
some  assessment,  an  organisation  cannot  weed  out 
unacceptable  probationary  employees.  Without  some 
evaluative  information,  it  may  be  difficult  for  some 
employees  to  identify  strengths  to  build  from  or 
weaknesses to work on. Without assessment, we cannot 
choose  the  best  candidates  for  promotion,  nor  can  we 
identify those who are bad fits and should be encouraged 
to pursue new career paths (Coens & Jenkins, 2000). 
Political  problems:  Whilst  rating  errors  and  bias  may  be 
subconscious  and  unintended,  research  demonstrates  that 
both  the  rater  and  the  ratee  deliberately  distort,  abuse  or 
misuse  the  process  with  political  motives.  According  to 
Rusli Ahmad (2007, cited by Ahmad & Lemba, 2010), PA 
involves the use of various types of political influences and 
power and the relationship between employee and manager 
or superordinates and subordinates or raters and ratees will 
build an internal political relationship. In fact, it is not an 
exaggeration to say that the first rule of corporate politics is 
that there are no rules. 
Managerial politics: For good or bad reasons, supervisors 
and managers make advance decisions of what they want 
to  see  happen  and  then  use  ratings  as  a  vehicle  to  get 
those results. The goal may be to get someone a hefty pay 
raise or to ensure that someone is barred from promotion. 
As  supervisors  compress  PAs  for  motivational  purposes, 
this  political  behaviour  might  be  perceived  to  represent 
managerial  discretion  exercised  to  ensure  the  attainment 
of  goals  and  potentially  benefit  the  individual  employee 
and even the organisation as a whole. As a result, it might 
be perceived an effective use of the pay system (Salimäki & 
Jamsen, 2010). 
Political  abuse  by  employees:  Employees  too,  attempt  to 
manoeuvre  and  distort  the  system.  Researchers  call  this 
impression management, which comes in many variations 
more  commonly  known  as  ‘brown-nosing’  or  ‘hey-look-
what-I-did’.  Employees  know  when  appraisal  time  is 
coming around – they start saying good morning and take 
time to chitchat with the boss. Whilst obvious or aggressive 
impression  management  may  backfire,  some  research 
indicates that managers give the highest raises to politically 
connected people who would threaten to complain if they 
did not get a substantial pay raise (Coens & Jenkins, 2000). 
International  versus  local  perspective:  According  to 
Grobler  et  al.  (2006)  PA  is  not  only  implemented  in  local 
organisations but throughout the whole world, in public and 
private organisations. Going global will inevitably impact on 
the activities performed by the company’s HR department. 
The PA process helps to clarify performance expectations, 
provide  a  framework  for  progress  reviews  and  identify 
developmental needs. It would be correct to conclude that 
for most employees, PA is an inherently natural management 
practice – even when it is not well done. This conclusion 
may not hold for the manager working in Latin America, 
the Middle East or any number of non-Western countries. 
A  variation  of  the  critical  incidents  method  is  used  for 
employees in Chinese companies, but in none of these is the 
PA used as evidence for promotion and merit pay decisions. 
Seniority (time on the job) is considered the most important 
determinant when it comes to these decisions. Original Research
doi:10.4102/sajhrm.v12i1.525 http://www.sajhrm.co.za
Page 5 of 9
When evaluating employees of the host country, the process 
can be extremely frustrating to someone who is not familiar 
with the local culture’s expectation of the roles of the boss 
and the subordinate. Different cultures have their own ideas 
and beliefs about what the culture defines as incompetent, 
mediocre and excellent work performance. In most countries, 
it is performance that counts; in Islamic countries, however, it 
may be the subordinate’s personality and social behaviour – 
not job performance – that matter. Besides the cultural issues 
that complicate PA in the international environment, there 
are many other issues that also make it extremely difficult. 
Although these issues can complicate the PA process, it is 
important that some type of evaluation takes place as it has 
a  major  impact  on  the  expatriate’s  promotion  and  career 
alternatives  upon  repatriation  back  home  (Grobler  et  al., 
2006). 
In supporting the need for human capital development, the 
Malaysian government implemented the HR Development 
Act in 1992 to assist unskilled and skilled workers to achieve 
an  adequate  level  of  the  skills  and  knowledge  required 
to  perform  effectively  in  organisations.  It  was  under  this 
legislation  that  government  implemented  numerous 
incentives to assist employers in the manufacturing industries 
to  develop  its  employees.  Kirkpatrick  (1996,  cited  by 
Abdullah, Ahsan & Alam, 2009) indicates that in evaluating 
employees’  learning,  the  organisation  will  be  looking  for 
evidence  of  how  changed  job  behaviour  influences  other 
employees  and  the  way  the  organisation  functions.  This 
would  mean  measuring  changes  in  overall  organisational 
functioning with respect to productivity, output and costs, 
but such an exercise would be difficult to undertake. 
South Africa’s performance appraisal dilemma: According 
to  Grobler  et  al.  (2006),  a  comprehensive  survey  of  nine 
leading  South  African  organisations  undertaken  by  the 
University of Stellenbosch Business School revealed a rather 
bleak picture of the way employee performance is managed 
and rewarded in SA. Major problems that were identified 
during the survey include the existence of a rather negative 
working culture, changes in corporate strategy that did not 
result in corresponding behaviour changes and insufficient 
line  management  support  for  performance  management. 
Regarding periodic and formal reviews, it became apparent 
that there was: a lack of follow-up of performance reviews, 
over-emphasis  on  the  appraisal  aspect  at  the  expense  of 
development,  inadequate  performance  information  and 
inadequately maintained objectivity.
Research design
Method
Research participants
In this research, the population figure of 300 was obtained 
from the Persal system at the time the research was done and 
comprises the total number of employees at levels 3–12 of the 
filled posts at head office. Levels 9–12 are managers, levels 
7–8 supervisors, whilst non-managerial roles are levels 6 and 
below.
The  study  used  simple  random  sampling  to  arrive  at  the 
group of employees chosen to participate. Since there were 
300  employees  on  levels  3–12  who  were  targeted  for  the 
study, 150 employees were randomly selected, thus 50% of 
the  population;  108  employees  responded  (73%  response 
rate). Amongst the respondents 60 (56%) are female whilst 
48 (44%) are male. Babbie and Mouton (2001) indicate that a 
response rate of 50% is adequate for analysis, whilst response 
rates of 60% and 70% are good and very good, respectively. 
The questionnaire response rate obtained in the study was 
therefore considered to be sufficient for analysis.
The majority of respondents (34.7%) are in non-managerial 
positions, whilst 33.7% are supervisors and the minority of 
respondents (31.6%) are in management positions. Most of 
the respondents, 51.0%, have either a diploma or a degree 
qualification and 23.0% hold an honours or master’s degree.
Measuring instruments
The  first  part  of  the  questionnaire  (section  A,  questions 
1–11), which focused on the demographics, was taken from 
Louw (2006); some alterations were made: the current salary 
level was included and the educational qualifications were 
extended  to  include  honours  degree,  master’s  degree  and 
higher. The second part (section B, a pre-coded questionnaire 
numbered  1–25),  was  taken  from  Tziner  et  al.  (1996)  and 
is considered to be one of the standard questionnaires on 
politicisation. It consisted mainly of open-ended questions 
and was utilised with minor alterations. The questionnaire 
was pre-tested on 10 employees of the NWDoH in Mahikeng 
and their contributions were incorporated. 
Research procedure
Self-administered  questionnaires  were  utilised  to  collect 
data. Each questionnaire included a covering letter inviting 
subjects to participate in the study voluntarily. It assured 
them that their  responses would remain confidential. The 
covering letter stated that completing the questionnaires and 
returning them meant that the participants agreed that the 
researcher could use the results for research purposes only. 
One hundred and fifty (150) questionnaires were distributed 
to participants and a further 50 questionnaires were emailed 
to participants. Participants were requested to complete the 
questionnaire within 10 days. 
It  is  believed  that  the  population  from  which  the  sample 
was  drawn  was  representative  of  the  public  service.  The 
reason for this is that, firstly, experience has shown that the 
specific comments or criticisms concerning PA are common 
throughout the public service. Secondly, with the constant 
migration  of  public  servants  through  inter-departmental 
and  inter-provincial  transfers,  it  can  be  expected  that  the 
application  of  the  system  must  become  more  and  more 
stereotyped  and  therefore  be  subject  to  similar  criticisms 
throughout the public service. Thirdly, because the system is 
universally applicable throughout the public service, training 
methods  and  information  concerning  the  administration 
of the system are originated and controlled from a single Original Research
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central  source.  This  means  that  individual  departments 
cannot deviate from the rules as set out in the Public Service 
staff code, leading to a situation which also lends itself to 
uniformity (Rademan & Vos, 2001).
Statistical analysis
The  statistical  analysis  was  done  through  the  use  of  the 
Statistical  Package  for  the  Social  Sciences  (SPSS).  Each 
question  of  the  questionnaire  was  analysed  separately. 
Descriptive  statistics,  reliability,  validity  and  correlation 
statistics were utilised to analyse the data.
Results
Reliability
According  to  George  and  Mallery  (2006),  the  closer  the 
Cronbach’s alpha is to 1, the greater the internal consistency 
of items in the instrument being assessed. From the reliability 
statistics given in Table 1, it is observed that the Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficient is 0.733 for the demographics data and 0.760 
for the performance and politicisation data. It is therefore 
deduced that the research instrument for this study is reliable 
and the results it produced can be trusted.
Test of significance (Spearman’s rank correlation)
The p-values (0.024 and 0.043) in Table 1 are lower than the 
0.050 level of significance. This shows that the correlation 
between  educational  qualification  and  perception  of 
employees  about  performance  appraisals  is  significant. 
The positive correlation coefficients (0.215 and 0.195) imply 
that highly qualified employees tend to disagree with the 
statements listed in Table 1, whereas less qualified employees 
tend to agree.
The  p-values  in  Table  2  are  lower  than  the  0.05  level  of 
significance. This shows that the correlation between work 
experience and perception of employees about performance 
appraisals is significant. The negative correlation coefficients 
(–0.199,  –0.217,  –0.248  and  –0.192)  imply  that  more 
experienced  employees  tend  to  agree  with  the  statements 
listed in Table 2, whereas less experienced employees tend 
to disagree.
Politicisation of performance appraisals
Table 3 indicates the percentage of respondents who agree 
with the statement.
t-test between subgroups in samples
The  statistical  software  package  (SPSS  18.0)  was  used  to 
perform  a  t-test  between  two  independent  samples  (male 
and female employees). Since the p-value is lower than the 
0.05  level  of  significance,  it  means  that  the  correlation  is 
significant.
Chi-square test of independence
This test of independence is concerned with the relationship 
between two different factors (or categories) in a population 
under study (see Table 4).
Microsoft Excel was used to perform a chi-square test for 
the data in Table 4. The chi-square statistic and the p-value 
with one degree of freedom are 3.193 and 0.074, respectively. 
Since the p-value is lower than the 10% level of significance, 
the opinion of employees about the performance appraisal 
procedure in the department is significantly dependent on 
their gender. It means that the majority (14/23 = 61%) of 
employees who tend to agree that the performance appraisal 
procedure in the department is fair and transparent are men, 
whereas the majority (51/85 = 60%) of the employees who 
tend to disagree are women.
Discussion
This  research  revealed  that  there  is  some  form  of 
politicisation  in  the  way  in  which  PAs  are  conducted 
in  the  department.  The  results  show  that  the  correlation 
between  age  category  and  the  perception  of  employees 
about PA is significant since the p-values are less than 0.05. 
There is a difference in the perception of younger and older 
TABLE 1: Spearman’s rank correlation between educational qualification and perception of employees about performance appraisals.
Perception Correlation coefficient  Educational 
qualification
Supervisors avoid giving performance appraisals that may have negative consequences for the employees (e.g. no 
promotion, layoff, no bonus, salary freezes, etc.).
Correlation coefficient (r) 0.215
p-value 0.024
Employees holding a high status position in their organisation will get a higher performance appraisal than is 
deserved (i.e. regardless of their real performance, employee appraisals are affected by the organisational status 
of the positions they hold).
Correlation coefficient (r) 0.195
p-value 0.043
TABLE 2: Spearman’s rank correlation between work experience and perception of employees about performance appraisals.
Perception Correlation coefficient Work experience
Supervisors avoid giving performance appraisals that may antagonise employees (e.g. a low rating). Correlation coefficient (r) -0.199
p-value 0.040
Supervisors inflate the performance appraisals of employees who have access to valuable sources of information. Correlation coefficient (r) -0.217
p-value 0.023
Supervisors are likely to give an inflated performance appraisal in order to avoid negative or uncomfortable 
feedback sessions with subordinates.
Correlation coefficient (r) -0.248
p-value 0.009
Supervisors produce accurate performance appraisals only to the extent that they may be rewarded for doing so or 
failing to do so.
Correlation coefficient (r) -0.192
p-value 0.045Original Research
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people regarding some aspects of PA. It was found that the 
correlation  between  educational  qualifications  and  work 
experience  and  PA  is  also  significant.  Furthermore,  the 
findings  of  the  Spearman’s  rank  correlation  showed  that 
the  correlation  between  the  period  of  conducting  PA  and 
age, educational qualifications and work experience is also 
significant.  Employees  of  31  years  and  older,  with  higher 
qualifications and more experience, believe that PAs should 
be conducted more regularly.
Summary of key findings 
The PAs in the North West Department of Health and Social 
Development have a number of weaknesses, as shown by the 
responses from the outcome of the research. The following 
aspects have been identified for discussion as they show a 
high response rate by respondents.
Forms of favouritism
Respondents  indicated  that  managers  allocate  higher 
performance appraisals than are deserved:
•	 in order to repay favours to their employees, 82%
•	 to procure special services, favours or benefits, 73%
•	 to  employees  who  control  valuable  organisation 
resources, 75%
TABLE 3: Response percentages.
Number Item Mean Agree % Disagree %
1 Supervisors avoid giving performance appraisals that may antagonise employees (e.g. a low rating). 3.67 43.9 56.1
2 Supervisors avoid giving a low performance appraisal because they fear that employees will try to transfer to other 
bosses.
4.50 27.3 72.7
3 Supervisors inflate performance appraisals of those people who can procure for them special services, favours or 
benefits.
2.54 76.9 23.1
4 Supervisors inflate the performance appraisals of employees who have access to valuable sources of information. 2.64 84.4 15.6
5 Supervisors’ performance appraisals reflect in part their personal like or dislike of employees. 1.99 86.2 13.8
6 Supervisors’ appraisals are affected by the extent to which employees are perceived as sharing the same basic values 
as them.
2.88 78.2 21.8
7 The performance ratings of employees are affected by their ability to inspire enthusiasm in the supervisor who 
appraises their performance.
3.04 64.5 35.5
8 Supervisors give performance appraisals that will make them look good to their own supervisors. 3.39 57.8 42.2
9 The quality of the supervisor-subordinate personal relationship throughout the appraisal period (e.g. tense or relaxed, 
trusting or distrusting, friendly or hostile) affects the performance rating.
1.87 90.0 10.0
10 Supervisors are likely to give an inflated performance appraisal in order to avoid negative or uncomfortable feedback 
sessions with subordinates.
3.06 60.6 39.4
11 Supervisors avoid giving performance appraisals that may have negative consequences for the employees (e.g. no 
promotions, layoff, no bonus, salary freezes, etc.).
3.64 36.4 63.6
12 Supervisors inflate performance appraisals in order to maximise rewards for their subordinates (e.g. salary increases, 
promotions, bonus, etc.).
3.72 44.0 56.0
13 Supervisors produce accurate performance appraisals only to the extent that they may be rewarded for doing so or 
failing to do so.
3.90 37.6 62.4
14 Supervisors produce accurate performance appraisals only to the extent that they are perceived as a norm in their 
organisation.
3.25 64.2 35.8
15 Employees holding a high status position in their organisation will get a higher performance appraisal than is deserved 
(i.e. regardless of their real performance, employee appraisals are affected by the organisational status of the positions 
they hold).
2.38 80.0 20.0
16 Supervisors give high performance ratings because they believe that their subordinates have already passed through 
many organisation hurdles and therefore are highly competent.
4.17 23.6 76.4
17 In assigning ratings, supervisors conform to what they believe is normative (acceptable) in their organisation so as to 
avoid disapproval by their peers. 
3.51 45.5 54.5
18 Supervisors give low performance appraisals to teach rebellious employees a lesson. 2.39 78.0 22.0
19 Supervisors use performance appraisals to send a message to their employees (e.g. encourage risk-taking, creativity, 
etc.).
2.34 79.1 20.9
20 Supervisors inflate performance appraisals of those employees who possess special characteristics (e.g. high popularity, 
compliancy, etc.).
2.51 81.8 18.2
21 The fear that performance appraisals may threaten the self-esteem of subordinates discourages supervisors from giving 
an appraisal that is negative although accurate.
4.02 30.9 69.1
22 Supervisors give higher performance ratings than are deserved in order to gain support or cooperation from their 
employees.
3.36 50.5 49.5
23 Supervisors give higher performance appraisals than are deserved in order to repay favours to their employees. 2.40 83.6 16.4
24 Supervisors give equivalent performance ratings to all their subordinates in order to avoid resentment and rivalries 
amongst them. 
4.15 27.3 72.7
25 Supervisors give higher performance appraisals than are deserved to those employees who control valuable 
organisation resources.
2.85 76.4 23.6
26 Performance appraisals in the department are only about getting rewards. 2.22 77.3 22.7
27 The criterion for assessment is based on the strategic goals of the department. 3.56 40.0 60.0
28 The performance appraisal procedure in the department is fair and transparent. 4.17 21.8 78.2
29 Supervisors use performance appraisals to achieve the goals of the department and to build capacity of employees. 4.05 28.2 71.8
30 Performance appraisal helps to improve the performance of the department and develop skills of employees. 4.05 24.8 75.2
TABLE 4: Cross-tabulation of employee opinions about performance appraisals 
by gender.
Gender Statement: The performance appraisal 
procedure in the department is fair and 
transparent.
Agree Disagree Total
Female 9 51 60
Male 14 34 48
Total 23 85 108
Chi-square = 3.193
p-value = 0.074 
df = 1Original Research
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•	 to access information, 82%
•	 to reward employees they like, 84%
•	 to employees who share the same values, 78%
•	 to  employees  holding  a  high  status  position  in  the 
organisation, 82%
•	 to employees who have certain characteristics (e.g. high 
popularity, compliancy, etc.), 81%.
Coetsee (2002) is of the view that one of the most common 
deficiencies  of  performance  evaluation  systems  is  that 
unnecessary factors are measured, such as certain irrelevant 
personality traits. A high number (78%) of the respondents 
agree  that  supervisors  give  low  performance  appraisals 
to  teach  rebellious  employees  a  lesson  as  well  as  to  send 
a  message  to  their  employees.  These  findings  reveal  that 
performance appraisals are not handled properly and fairly 
in the department. Supervisors use them to settle personal 
vendettas or differences, which is a serious weakness. The 
findings  further  show  that  some  employees  are  unfairly 
victimised due to other things than their actual performance 
through  the  use  of  performance  appraisals.  Performance 
appraisal should focus on the performance of employees in 
doing the work that was planned with the supervisor and 
not be used as a way to discourage risk-taking, creativity and 
so on. Supervisors should devise other strategies to motivate 
and mobilise employees to do their work better. 
Respondents further indicated that:
•	 performance appraisal in the department is only done for 
reward, 85%
•	 the  quality  of  the  supervisor-subordinate  personal 
relationship affects the performance rating, 92%
•	 the criterion for assessment is based on the strategic goals 
of the department, 60%
•	 managers  inflate  performance  appraisals  in  order  to 
maximise  rewards  for  their  subordinates  (e.g.  salary 
increases, promotions, layoff, no bonus, salary freezes, 
etc.), 51%
•	 supervisors use performance appraisals to send a message 
to their employees, 78%
•	 employees holding a high status position in the organisation 
will receive higher PAs than are deserved, 90%
•	 PAs are not fair and transparent, 77%.
The above weaknesses are good examples of politicisation 
in an organisation in which management discretion is high 
and determines the success or failure of subordinates. This 
happens to the extent that processes such as work appraisals, 
promotions and transfers rest on ill-defined, poorly known or 
ambiguous criteria and so such perceptions are exacerbated 
(Gandz  &  Murray,  1980).  It  suggests  that  supervisors  use 
PAs for their own personal gain and not to improve service 
delivery or to develop and reward employees. 
Limitations
This study has been limited to the department of Health and 
Social Development, head office only, which could limit the 
generalisations of the findings. The districts, which form a 
major part of the department, have not been included.
Conclusions
It is therefore important that when PAs are held, managers 
or raters should be aware that PAs are not a ‘one size fits 
all’. Again, jobs differ in content and expected results; thus, 
it is important that organisations develop different sets of 
PA that will cover specific task and job holders (Migiro & 
Taderera, 2011). 
On the issue of inflating results, managers should realise that 
perceptions  of  procedural  unfairness  can  adversely  affect 
employees’  organisational  commitment,  job  satisfaction, 
trust in management and performance as well as their work-
related  stress,  theft  and  inclination  to  litigate  against  the 
employer (Heslin & Vande Walle, 2009); 
On the issue of PAs being about rewards only, managers 
should  consider  separating  assessment  for  development 
and assessment for rewards. Linkage to rewards outcomes 
reduces or eliminates the developmental value of appraisals. 
To  eliminate  any  problems  of  bias,  discrimination, 
favouritism or the like, a PA system needs to include a review 
mechanism. The next higher level of management, usually 
the evaluator’s immediate supervisor, should automatically 
review all evaluations of employees made by subordinate 
managers.  The  purpose  of  this  managerial  review  is  for 
auditing the evaluation for fairness, consistency and accuracy 
and assuring that the evaluator has carried out their function 
objectively (Fanga & Gerhart, 2012). 
Organisations should also have appraisal appeal procedures. 
An  appeal  process  would  serve  three  purposes:  (1)  it 
protects employees from unfair appraisals, (2) it protects the 
organisation from potential charges of unfairness and (3) it 
helps to assure that appraisers do a more conscientious job 
evaluation because they know their appraisals are subject 
to examination by others in the organisation (Allen & Rush, 
1998; Curath & Humprey, 2008, cited by Migiro & Taderera, 
2011).
It  is  vital  therefore  to  create  a  two-way  channel  of 
communication between managers and employees regarding 
performance standards and expectations, as Analoui (2007) 
puts it, so that the managers are not accused of politicising 
appraisals.
The conclusion is thus made that there are weaknesses in the 
manner in which PAs in the department are conducted. It 
has also been confirmed that the process is highly politicised 
as  could  be  seen  by  the  high  percentage  rates  given  by 
respondents. 
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